Long before the appearance of the global jihadits movement, the activities of variety of internal ethno-nationalist and religious militant groups posed one of the most significant threats to polities of the Southeast Asia region. During the 1990s, the residual threat posed by sub state extremism had risen-both in reactions to the modernizations pursued vigorously by many Southeast Asian state and as a result of radical influence from the Middle East and South Asia. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a network that connects militants in Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, today poses main the main regional terrorist threat in Southeast Asia. JI is considered part of al-Qaeda’s international terrorist network, but it is in fact a distinct organization with its own objectives and localized goals. The group, which operates solely within Southeast Asia, seeks to establish a pan-Islamic state in that region comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Muslim areas of the Philippines and Southern Thailand.
After the arrest of militants following the Bali I, Jakarta Marriott Hotel I, Australian Embassy, The Bal II, and nearly Jakarta Marriott Hotel II bombing in Indonesia, there appears to increased dissension within JI. And related terrorist offshoots have newly surfaced, according documents seized by the Indonesian Authorities, one of the key JI operatives still at large. The Malaysian Noordin M. Top, is named as the leader of group named Tanzim Qai’dat al-Jihad, or Organization on the base of Jihad. These offshoots are probably not new organizations but merely regroupings of militants around different nuclei within JI.
JI’s ideological root that back to the Darul Islam rebellion in Indonesia. Lasting from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, the rebellion informed the thinking of radical Indonesian Muslims. The cofounders of the organization were two Indonesian clerics, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu BAkar Ba’ayir. In early 1970s, the two established Islamic Boarding School (pesantren) in Ngruki, Central Java, that became one of fountainheads of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia-the so-called Ngruki network. From 1978 to 1982 the two were imprisoned by the Soeharto government. After their release, they moved to Malaysia, where they came in contact with an Indonesian al-Qaeda operative and veteran of the Afghan war, Riduan Isamuddin, alias Hambali. Hambali is the only southeast Asian Member of the shura or central council of al-Qaeda, provided the link between the indigenous Indonesian Radical and al-Qaeda. He was also the chief conduit for fund from al-Qaeda to JI. Another key figure was Mohammed Iqbal Abdur Rahman (alias Abu Jibril), an Indonesian national who, before his arrest in Malaysia in 2002. is alleged to have been head of training for al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. A map of the region is shown in figure.
Following the collapse of Soeharto’s government in 1998, Sungkar and Ba’asyir returned to Indonesia. In 1999, Sungkar died and Ba’asyir became the emir or spiritual leader of the organization. Ba’asyir established the Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) in yogyakarta, a religious organization that analysts within and outside Indonesia believe serves as a political cover for JI’s political activities. After the Bali bombing of October 12, 2002, Ba’asyir was charged and convicted of immigration law violations. He was subsequently released by a judge, but immediately rearrested on terrorism charges and, at the time of writing, remains in police custody. Ba’asyir denies any association with JI or its terrorist agenda.
It is believed that JI began establishing cells across Southeast Asia in collaboration with al-Qaeda as early as 1993. regional intelligence source have identified two figures as central to the group’s early recruitment and placement efforts: hambali, a veteran of the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan who before his capture was thought to have acted as bin Laden’s main point of contact in the region; and abu Jibril who, as noted above, is alleged to have been “head of training” for al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. Hambali was captured in August 2003 in Ayutthaya, Thailand, and is believed to be in U.S custody. Abu Jibril was arrested in Malaysia in June 2001, where he remained in prison until he was deported to Indonesia in May 2004. Indonesian prosecutors initially accused him of involvement in several bombing in Indonesia but later dropped the charges because of lack of evidence. He is currently active in MMI. Two key JI operatives responsible for Bali bombing, Imam Samudra and Mukhlas (alias Ali Gufran), Hambali’s reflacement as operational chief , were captured, tried, and sentenced to death. Another high-profile terrorist, JI’s top bom-marker Dr. Azahari Husain, and two subordinates were killed in a polise raid on their hideout near the east javan town of Malang in November 2005. still at large are Noordin M. Top; Zulkarnaen, reported to be the current JI operational chief; Dulmatin, an electronics specialist known for his bom-making expertise; and Umar Patek, a recruitment and training expert. (The last two are believed to be hiding out in Mindanao).
After the arrest of militants following the Bali I, Jakarta Marriott Hotel I, Australian Embassy, The Bal II, and nearly Jakarta Marriott Hotel II bombing in Indonesia, there appears to increased dissension within JI. And related terrorist offshoots have newly surfaced, according documents seized by the Indonesian Authorities, one of the key JI operatives still at large. The Malaysian Noordin M. Top, is named as the leader of group named Tanzim Qai’dat al-Jihad, or Organization on the base of Jihad. These offshoots are probably not new organizations but merely regroupings of militants around different nuclei within JI.
JI’s ideological root that back to the Darul Islam rebellion in Indonesia. Lasting from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, the rebellion informed the thinking of radical Indonesian Muslims. The cofounders of the organization were two Indonesian clerics, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu BAkar Ba’ayir. In early 1970s, the two established Islamic Boarding School (pesantren) in Ngruki, Central Java, that became one of fountainheads of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia-the so-called Ngruki network. From 1978 to 1982 the two were imprisoned by the Soeharto government. After their release, they moved to Malaysia, where they came in contact with an Indonesian al-Qaeda operative and veteran of the Afghan war, Riduan Isamuddin, alias Hambali. Hambali is the only southeast Asian Member of the shura or central council of al-Qaeda, provided the link between the indigenous Indonesian Radical and al-Qaeda. He was also the chief conduit for fund from al-Qaeda to JI. Another key figure was Mohammed Iqbal Abdur Rahman (alias Abu Jibril), an Indonesian national who, before his arrest in Malaysia in 2002. is alleged to have been head of training for al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. A map of the region is shown in figure.
Following the collapse of Soeharto’s government in 1998, Sungkar and Ba’asyir returned to Indonesia. In 1999, Sungkar died and Ba’asyir became the emir or spiritual leader of the organization. Ba’asyir established the Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) in yogyakarta, a religious organization that analysts within and outside Indonesia believe serves as a political cover for JI’s political activities. After the Bali bombing of October 12, 2002, Ba’asyir was charged and convicted of immigration law violations. He was subsequently released by a judge, but immediately rearrested on terrorism charges and, at the time of writing, remains in police custody. Ba’asyir denies any association with JI or its terrorist agenda.
It is believed that JI began establishing cells across Southeast Asia in collaboration with al-Qaeda as early as 1993. regional intelligence source have identified two figures as central to the group’s early recruitment and placement efforts: hambali, a veteran of the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan who before his capture was thought to have acted as bin Laden’s main point of contact in the region; and abu Jibril who, as noted above, is alleged to have been “head of training” for al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. Hambali was captured in August 2003 in Ayutthaya, Thailand, and is believed to be in U.S custody. Abu Jibril was arrested in Malaysia in June 2001, where he remained in prison until he was deported to Indonesia in May 2004. Indonesian prosecutors initially accused him of involvement in several bombing in Indonesia but later dropped the charges because of lack of evidence. He is currently active in MMI. Two key JI operatives responsible for Bali bombing, Imam Samudra and Mukhlas (alias Ali Gufran), Hambali’s reflacement as operational chief , were captured, tried, and sentenced to death. Another high-profile terrorist, JI’s top bom-marker Dr. Azahari Husain, and two subordinates were killed in a polise raid on their hideout near the east javan town of Malang in November 2005. still at large are Noordin M. Top; Zulkarnaen, reported to be the current JI operational chief; Dulmatin, an electronics specialist known for his bom-making expertise; and Umar Patek, a recruitment and training expert. (The last two are believed to be hiding out in Mindanao).
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