JI is believed to operate in much the sane networked manner as al-Qaeda. The organization’s structure comprises the following: (1) a central command (qiyadah naraziah), which is part of a wider governing council (majlis Qiadah); (2) a hard core of dedication jihadists (number vary greatly by source); and (3) a wider associate base that is drawn from both established insurgent militant organization an loosely connected radicals scattered across the region. According to a 2003 Singapore Government White Paper, these cadres are organized into specific territorial cells, known as mantiqis that cover the following areas:
· M1: Singapore, Malaysia (except Sabah) and Southern Thailand
· M2: Indonesia (except Sulawesi and Kalimantan)
· M3: Sabah, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and Southern Philippines
· M4: Australia and the Indonesian province of Papua (Irian Jaya).
JI came to the world’s attention in December 2001, when a major international terrorist plot was uncovered in Singapore that was to have involved the bombings of U.S. Navy vessels docked at the Changi Nava Base, the ministry of Defense, a shuttle bus serving the Sembawang Wharves and Yishun subway, the British and Australian High Commission, the U.S. and Israeli embassies, an commercial complexes housing American firms. The plan came to light when the Singaporean intelligence service, which had been monitoring the JI cell, arrested the members to disrupt the attacks. Subsequently, a videotape and notes reconnaissance of potential target in Singapore were found in the house of al-Qaeda military leader Mohammad Atef in Kabul (Atef was killed in U.S. air strike).
The actual mechanics of the Singapore operation, which intelligence authorities estimate took two years of planning, fell to the late Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi (a senior JI bom maker closely tied to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) who was killed by Filipino forces in 2003 after his escape from a Manila prison) and Mohammed Jabara. Working under the respective aliases of “Mike” and “Sammy”. The two JI members coordinated a local reestablished cell of militants. Helping to select appropriate target and fine-tune the logistics for the planned bombing.
Although the Singapore plot was thwarted, several other terrorist attacks have been directly linked to JI since 2000. these include a series of near-simultaneous bombing that killed 22 people in the Philippine capital in December 2000; 38 church explosions in Indonesia the same month; a further string of attacks in Manila in 2002; the October 12, 2002, Bali bombing-rivaled only by the Madrid train bombing of March 11, 2004, as the worst act of international terrorism since the September 11 attacks; a suicide attack on U.S.-owned Marriott Hotel in Jakarta on August 5,2003, that killed 13 people and left dozens injured; a car bombing outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta on September 9, 2004, that killed on October 1, 2005, that killed 23 people, including the three perpetrators.
The sequence of attacks suggests a one year cycle for executions, although the planning might have gone on a longer period. The methods of the first three attacks involved car bombs. However, the lack of success of the JW. Marriott and Australian embassy attacks, where all casualties except for one were Indonesian, might explain the abandonment of cars as the method of delivery for the explosives in favor of bomb carried in backpacks by suicides bombers. This method allows the terrorist to target their attacks more precisely on establishments frequented by foreigners and those catering to them.
· M1: Singapore, Malaysia (except Sabah) and Southern Thailand
· M2: Indonesia (except Sulawesi and Kalimantan)
· M3: Sabah, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and Southern Philippines
· M4: Australia and the Indonesian province of Papua (Irian Jaya).
JI came to the world’s attention in December 2001, when a major international terrorist plot was uncovered in Singapore that was to have involved the bombings of U.S. Navy vessels docked at the Changi Nava Base, the ministry of Defense, a shuttle bus serving the Sembawang Wharves and Yishun subway, the British and Australian High Commission, the U.S. and Israeli embassies, an commercial complexes housing American firms. The plan came to light when the Singaporean intelligence service, which had been monitoring the JI cell, arrested the members to disrupt the attacks. Subsequently, a videotape and notes reconnaissance of potential target in Singapore were found in the house of al-Qaeda military leader Mohammad Atef in Kabul (Atef was killed in U.S. air strike).
The actual mechanics of the Singapore operation, which intelligence authorities estimate took two years of planning, fell to the late Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi (a senior JI bom maker closely tied to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) who was killed by Filipino forces in 2003 after his escape from a Manila prison) and Mohammed Jabara. Working under the respective aliases of “Mike” and “Sammy”. The two JI members coordinated a local reestablished cell of militants. Helping to select appropriate target and fine-tune the logistics for the planned bombing.
Although the Singapore plot was thwarted, several other terrorist attacks have been directly linked to JI since 2000. these include a series of near-simultaneous bombing that killed 22 people in the Philippine capital in December 2000; 38 church explosions in Indonesia the same month; a further string of attacks in Manila in 2002; the October 12, 2002, Bali bombing-rivaled only by the Madrid train bombing of March 11, 2004, as the worst act of international terrorism since the September 11 attacks; a suicide attack on U.S.-owned Marriott Hotel in Jakarta on August 5,2003, that killed 13 people and left dozens injured; a car bombing outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta on September 9, 2004, that killed on October 1, 2005, that killed 23 people, including the three perpetrators.
The sequence of attacks suggests a one year cycle for executions, although the planning might have gone on a longer period. The methods of the first three attacks involved car bombs. However, the lack of success of the JW. Marriott and Australian embassy attacks, where all casualties except for one were Indonesian, might explain the abandonment of cars as the method of delivery for the explosives in favor of bomb carried in backpacks by suicides bombers. This method allows the terrorist to target their attacks more precisely on establishments frequented by foreigners and those catering to them.
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